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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
view is that the city, for the protection of the public, has established a standard
of care, to which it is the duty of the defendant to conform. The carrier owes
this duty to the injured party, as a part of the public, and a breach of it gives
rise to a cause of action in his favor.
Besides these two main rules there is an intermediate holding in Illinois, that
the violation of the ordinance creates a prima facie case of negligence rebuttable
by other evidence, C. & E. L R. Co. v. Crose, 214 Ill. 602. The Illinois rule is
followed in McElhinney v. Knittle, 201 N. W. 586 (Iowa). Kentucky has an ex-
treme holding that the ordinance is inadmissible for any purpose in a civil
action. Ford v. Paducah City Ry. Co., 99 S. W. 355, and L. & N. R. Co. v.
Dalton, 102 Ky. 290.
Logically the Massachusetts rule is correct. A public wrong does not create
a private right, and violation of a police regulation is mere evidence of want of
care. But as a matter of public policy, the doctrine of negligence per se is
more likely to enforce obedience to municipal ordinances, and the tendency is to
change that rule.
The history of this ruling in Missouri shows a rather interesting development.
The early cases, Liddy v. Ry. Co., 40 Mo. 516, and Karle v. R. R. Co., 55 Mo.
476, held that the violation of a statute was negligence per se. Then came the
case of Fath v. Tower Grove etc. Ry. Co., 105 Mo. 537, in which the court said
that the ordinance, when accepted by the railway company, became a contract
between it and the city and under the authority of Mayor of Lime Regis v.
Henley, 1 Bing. 222, held that the city's right of action for the breach of this
contract inured to the benefit of the plaintiff, Fath. This case was followed by
Byinton v. St. L. & Sub. Ry. Co., 147 Mo. 673, in which the plaintiff was not
'allowed to recover because it was not shown that the railway had ever accepted
the ordinance in question. Murphy v. Lindell Ry. Co., 153 Mo. 252, and Holwer-
son v. St. L. & Sub. Ry. Co., 157 Mo. 245, in accord.
Shortly after the Holwerson case, supra, the case of Jackson v. Ry. Co., 157
Mo. 635, was decided, expressly overruling Fath v. Ry. Co., supra, and re-
establishing the doctrine of Karle v. Ry. Co., supra. It held that an ordinance is
a police regulation and not a contract; and its violation is negligence per se.
This rule has been followed down to date in Missouri. Sluder v. Transit Co.,
189 Mo. 107, Henderson v. St. L. & S. F. R. Co., 248 S. W. 987, and Unter-
lachner v. Wells, 296 S. W. 755. C. J. E. '28.
WEAPONs-PISTOLs---AMGUNs.--The defendant was convicted under a New
York statute for having a "pistol, revolver, or other firearm of a size which
may be concealed upon the person, without a written license therefor." Upon
appeal his conviction was reversed and he was discharged. An examination of
the "pistol" proved that the projectile used was propelled by compressed air,
and was in no way connected with a projectile moved by gun powder or other
similar inflammable material. Held, that the possession of an air pistol does
not warrant conviction of unlawfully possessing a firearm. The basis of this
distinction was that the court felt unwilling to read a forced or subtle meaning
into the statute as it used the term "firearm." In re People v. Schmidt, 222 N. Y.
S. 647 (1927).
In Harris v. Cameron, 81 Wis. 239, 51 N. W. 437 (1892), the supreme court
was called upon to make a distinction between an air gun and a firearm in de-
ciding on the negligence of a father in buying an air gun for a minor son.
They held that an air gun was not a firearm, on the ground that a firearm is a
weapon which acts by the force of gun powder, and that it was intended as a
toy and did not have a dangerous character.
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The two foregoing decisions have for their bases the following quotation
from Cooper-Snell Co. v. State, 230 N. Y. 249: "One of the cardinal rules to be
applied in construing statutes is that they are to be read according to the
natural and obvious import of their language, without restoring to a subtle or
forced construction either limiting or extending their effect." This strict view
is not taken in all cases, although most definitions of "weapons" do not or-
dinarily include air guns.
By way of an interesting side-light on the problem of whether the air gun is
a firearm, we have the decision of Cada v. The Fair, 187 Ill. 111, where the
court held a toy air gun to be a toy firearm within the meaning of an ordinance
forbidding the sale to minors of "any gun, pistol, or other firearm, or any toy
gun, toy pistol, or other toy firearm in which any explosive substance can be
used." The court qualifies its opinion and declares this air gun to come under
the statute prohibiting firearms because it is a "toy" which is "a plaything for
children," and reasons, "such a toy gun" must be manifestly different from a
real gun, and the fact that children are to play with it takes it out of the hard
and fast definition of a firearm as used by a grown person. Furthermore, the
language of the statute qualifies this and brings us to a correct interpretation
because it is a "toy gun," and the statute specifically mentions "toy guns, toy
pistols, etc." However, the court goes further and qualifies its decision by ex-
plaining that compressed air is the cause of the explosion which propels the
projectile, and that consequently this brings it under the statute prohibiting
firearms in which any explosive substance may be used. This last qualification
is in conflict with previously mentioned decisions, and upon this ground, one
might quarrel with the Illinois case.
There does appear to be a certain relaxation on the part of the courts in
interpreting the words of the statute in regard to weapons. For example, it
was held in People v. Gogak, 171 N. W. 428 (1919), a Michigan case, that the
legislature intended, in certain acts, relating to the carrying of concealed
weapons, to go further than the specific weapons mentioned in the statute, and
to embrace any "other offensive and dangerous weapons or instruments con-
cealed upon his person." Here the court declared a knife to be a dangerous
weapon.
This illustrates one tendency of the courts which seems to be based on the
idea that legislative acts should be interpreted according to what the court
considers their true meaning. The other tendency is to a strict interpreta-
tion, as illustrated by the New York case. C. H. W., '28.
WITNESSES-COMPETENCY-CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONS AND PRIVILEGED CoM-
MuNICATIONs.-Defendant objected to the introduction of testimony on the
part of a nurse relating to information obtained while she was so employed as
nurse under the attending physician on the ground that such information was
privileged. Held, that the objection included all the testimony of the witness
and was too broad. Objection should have been made to each question calling
for privileged information. The court, however, intimates that communications
to the nurse as an assistant of the physician and as necessary to enable the
physician to prescribe would be privileged. Meyer et al. v. Russell, 214 N. W.
857, (N. D. 1927).
At common law there is no privilege as between physician and patient, and
this rule is still law where it has not been changed by statute, Green v. St. Louis
Terminal Railroad Association, 211 Mo. 18, 109 S. W. 715. At the present time,
however, the matter is generally controlled by statutes establishing as privileged
communications between physician and patient necessary for professional care,
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